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Abstract
Errors within circuits caused by radiation continue to be an important concern to
developers. A new methodology of real time fault detection and diagnostics utilizing FPGA
based architectures while under radiation were investigated in this research. The contributions of
this research are focused on three areas; a full test platform to evaluate a circuit while under
irradiation, an algorithm to detect and diagnose fault locations within a circuit, and finally to
characterize Triple Design Triple Modular Redundancy (TDTMR), a new form of TMR. Five
different test setups, injected fault test, gamma radiation test, thermal radiation test, optical laser
test, and optical flash test, were used to assess the effectiveness of these three research goals.
The testing platform was constructed with two FPGA boards, the Device Under Test
(DUT) and the controller board, to generate and evaluate specific vector sets sent to the DUT.
The testing platform combines a myriad of testing and measuring equipment and work hours
onto one small reprogrammable and reusable FPGA. This device was able to be used in multiple
test setups. The controlling logic can be interchanged to test multiple circuit designs under
various forms of radiation.
The detection and diagnostic algorithm was designed to determine fault locations in real
time. The algorithm used for diagnosing the fault location uses inverse deductive elimination.
By using test generation tools, fault lists were developed. The fault lists were used to narrow \
the possible fault locations within the circuit. The algorithm is able to detect single stuck at
faults based on these lists. The algorithm can also detect multiple output errors but not able to
diagnose multiple stuck at faults in real time.

iv

TDTMR utilized three unique forms of logic rather than having three copies of identical
circuitry. The three different adder designs used for this research are a behavioral adder, carry
look ahead adder, and ripple carry adder.
Based on the five tests, the testing platform operated successfully. The detection and
diagnosis algorithm was able to detect errors. The injected fault test was the only test that was
able to properly diagnosis the location of the fault. The results also unexpectedly showed that
the voting unit failed before any of the adders while under radiation. Dose rate versus total dose
has a differing effect on the DUT. The goals of this research was met by completing a fully
interchangeable and operational testing platform, an algorithm that detects and diagnosis errors
in real time, and an initial evaluation of TDTMR.
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REAL TIME FAULT DETECTION AND DIAGNOSTICS
USING FPGA-BASED ARCHITECTURES
I. Introduction
Electronics and technology continue to dominate the market and play an indispensible
role in space exploration. Space, while seemingly benign, is both volatile and chaotic. To study
such a vast, unknown area, man has launched satellites, space shuttles, and telescopes out into
space to gather more information about this unfamiliar place. These machines and devices
contain a vast array of electronics. Terrestrial electronics are largely protected from the effects
of radiation, not so in space.
Circuits and transistors endure a lot of stress in the harsh space environment. The study
of electronics in this environment is crucial for their reliable operation. The effects of radiation
on electronics are a principle concern. The current technique for protecting electronics in space
is to make them “Radiation Hardened”. While this brute force method is effective, a cheaper,
more effective means of combating radiation effects is always desirable.
A Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGAs) is an integrated circuit with the versatility to
be reprogrammed for multiple applications. A design utilizing FPGAs offers both cost cutting
and time-saving advantages over a design utilizing a conventional Application-Specific
Integrated Circuit (ASIC) [23]. Thus, FPGAs are increasingly being considered for various new
device applications throughout the commercial business world.
1.1 Motivation
Newer technologies are increasingly being developed on FPGAs due to their low costs
and increased performance results over traditional ASIC devices. Space radiation has the
potential of producing errors at the transistor level of electrical devices [1]. The current methods
to combat these conditions and minimize the overall damage due to errors are to use radiation
1

hardened ASIC or programmable logic devices found within FPGAs. Radiation hardened
devices are not 100% effective and they are expensive [3]. Commercial FPGAs have been
investigated as a cheaper means of electrical devices in space; however, they are not radiation
hardened [2, 3].
In an effort to combat this problem, computer models and real simulations have been
used to demonstrate the impacts of errors through various forms of radiation on specific
components of commercial FPGAs in addition to the FPGA itself. It is still difficult to
characterize the effects of radiation on electronics. An FPGA offers the versatility in creating a
platform to characterize and evaluate the damaging effects of radiation. A test platform cuts the
cost of having all the necessary measuring tools to evaluate a circuit.
An issue that has not been carefully investigated is attempting to locate and diagnose
specific faults within a circuit in real time. Testing circuits is a challenging undertaking and
attempting to diagnose the location of error presents an even greater challenge. Obtaining the
ability to locate errors in real time can aid in the understanding and classification of radiation
effects. A better understanding of these effects can lead to better counter measures and error
prevention techniques for protecting circuits from these errors.
Design logic and hardened by design both have been used in an effort to correct errors
while in a space environment. Various methods have been proven more effective than others and
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) has shown to be an effective fault redundancy method in
error correction [3-6]. Further investigation in improving TMR can demonstrate the importance
of fault redundancy in integrated circuits.
1.2 Scope
Research in this thesis will focus on the continuation of the topic of radiation effects on
2

electronics. Several forms of radiation are used in this research: a 60Co gamma cell (providing
ionizing radiation only), thermal radiation, and optical radiation. The two FPGA boards chosen
in this research are the Virtex-II-Pro and the FX12 mini module series both manufactured by
Xilinx. The testing platform will enable researchers to utilize it in other forms of radiation not
employed in this thesis.
1.3 Contributions
The overarching goal of this research was to characterize the effects of different radiation
forms on integrated circuits. The research facilitates the potential replacement of physically
hardened ASIC and FPGA devices, as well as allow for improvements in designs of nonradiation hardened electronics.
A test platform was developed in an effort to establish a base system that has the potential
to be used in various forms of radiation with multiple circuit designs. The test platform utilizes a
bridge board with ribbon cables to perform proper communication between the two FPGAs.
This design offered significant improvement from the previous Ethernet cable design [17]. The
testing platform provides the ability to generate a number of input vectors, monitor the values
that would be sent to the DUT, and analyze the resulting data.
Along with this testing platform, an algorithm was developed to diagnose and locate the
faults within the circuit. Upon uncovering an error within the circuit, the device locates which
circuit design’s output was faulty and switches to a real-time diagnostic mode. The circuit
undergoes a series of test and diagnostic vectors designed to pin point the exact stuck at fault
location within the integrated circuit with the best resolution possible without physically
destroying the chip. The testing platform helps validate the diagnosis algorithm on the FPGA
while under various radiation environments.
3

Finally, the research performed in this thesis attempts to demonstrate whether designhardening techniques can reduce system vulnerability to external errors. A new architecture
design and programming model was implemented to increase detection, correction and tolerance
of failures furthering the potential uses for FPGAs in the callous space radiation environments.
Triple Design TMR (TDTMR) was implemented into the logic in an effort to correct errors
without causing downtime in the circuit. Instead of the traditional three copies of the same
circuit design in TMR, a unique approach of having different design implementations of the
same circuit was used. This new method demonstrates that different design logic could be more
robust under the effects of radiation instead of having the same copy of the design three times.
This implementation hopes to improve the ability to correct these errors without needing to
reprogram the entire microelectronic device.
The contributions of this work include an analysis of commercial off the shelf (COTS)
reconfigurable electronics in radiation environments over the current use of radiation hardened
devices. Overall, the main contributions of this work are as follows:
1. Design a test platform utilizing a FPGA module that could send, receive, and process
data while under radiation.
2. Real-time diagnostics to uncover an error and pinpoint its location with the best
resolution in the quickest manner.
3. Utilizing design hardening techniques in a commercial FPGA with TDTMR.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The work performed on this thesis can be broken up to five main sections. Following this
introduction is background information on the topic and its related sources. The background
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covers radiation effects on electronics, current TMR methods used with circuit design, and
testing platforms.
Chapter 3 discusses the methodology used to formulate an optimal solution for the
research work performed on this topic. It also further discusses the design choices chosen for the
particular implementation used to complete the project. Chapter 4 covers the results obtained
through the methodology and a critical analysis of them. Finally, chapter 5 serves to summarize
and conclude the relevant work achieved through this thesis. It further discusses possible future
research within this area.

5

II. Background
2.1 Chapter Overview
This section describes key areas of background information related to the topic of this
thesis. Information on FPGAs, TMR, Fault detection and correction, radiation effects on
electronics, and radiation sources are covered in this chapter. A set of improvements made on
TMR are also described. There are many forms of radiation effects on electronics but Total
Dose Effect, Single Event Effects, and Single Event Upsets are only explained. The gamma and
thermal radiation sources are also described in this chapter.
2.2 Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA)
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are increasingly demanded by circuit
designers from all fields due to their high flexibility to meet multiple requirements such as high
performance, low costs, and the capability of on the fly reprogramming. FPGAs have been
known to be slower, less energy efficient, and generally achieve less functionality than their
fixed ASIC counterparts. However, the decreasing costs and development time needed to
implement FPGAs compared to designs using discrete logic devices have made programmable
logic devices favorable in space and avionic applications as well [7]. These forms of integrated
circuits contain an array of Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs) and programmable interconnects
in the circuit that allows the connection of different gates and structures. CLBs are made of
basic elements which include look-up tables, multiplexers, and flip flops along with routing
logic, pass transistors, and I/O pads. Each CLB can implement any Boolean function of its
inputs and can be linked together via routing blocks to implement more complex logic. The
CLBs are interconnected through a general routing matrix that comprises an array of routing
switches located at the intersections of horizontal and vertical routing channels [8].
6

FPGA devices have been used in space for more than a decade with a mixed level of
success; however, recently few reprogrammable devices have been used on spacecraft due to
their sensitivity to involuntary reconfiguration due to Single Event Upsets (SEU) [4]. Space
electronic designers are now more willing to utilize FPGAs in high radiation environments in
place of radiation hardened devices. They perform well in high throughput signal processing
applications often used in space. With the rising costs of radiation hardened devices, research
into utilizing FPGAs for hardened by design testing has grown significantly.
As previously mentioned, despite the growth of FPGA development, they still remain
susceptible to radiation errors. Since FPGAs store their programming data, or configuration in
an SRAM-like configuration memory, radiation can actually alter the intended circuit [6]. The
static memory elements and combinatorial logic paths are susceptible to upset from heavy ion
particles within the space environment. Protection of the combinational logic is therefore
required to avoid involuntary changes of functionality. It has been important to develop some
form of mitigation techniques to account for these errors to ensure reliable operation.
It is important to note that even though the growing use of FPGAs in space and radiation
environments are rapidly expanding, radiation induced errors provide a significant hindrance on
performance. New strategies have been implemented to help foster the growing field of FPGAs
in the space environment through hardened by design rather than radiation hardened. These
mitigation strategies of correcting the effects of radiation errors lead the way for this particular
research along with other research in this field.
2.3 Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)
Recently, several TMR methods have been introduced in an effort to reliably combat the
persistent problem of errors in integrated circuits. Some of the methods have been more
7

promising than others. The method chosen for this study of TMR was the technique of design
hardening also categorized as fault redundancy and correction.
TMR has been widely used as a form of design hardening to greatly improve the
reliability of FPGA designs to mitigate an upset as it occurs in the device configuration. TMR
has been shown to greatly improve the reliability of FPGA designs subject to SEUs [2]. This
mitigation technique traditionally uses three identical copies of a circuit which would run in
parallel. The outputs would then go through a majority voter circuit. If there would be an error
on one of the bits in one circuit, the TMR votes out the error. To improve the basic concept of
TMR, a few design enhancement steps were made on the simple three circuit and voter layout
(Figure 1).

Figure 1 – Basic TMR

The first addition was to expand the one bit voter layout shown in Figure 2 and triplicate
the voter unit so there would no longer be a single point of failure (Figure 3). This application
significantly reduces the configuration sensitivity of the design [2].
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Figure 2 – TMR Circuit Diagram

Figure 3 – TMR with Triplicated Voter

It was shown that these two designs suffer from resynchronization problems [3] meaning if a
faulty bit is ‘repaired’ in one of the voting logic, that bit would not be synchronized with the
other two copies of logic. By needing to correct the bit, a slight delay is introduced which
compounded over time may cause a synchronization issue. This problem can be prevented by
placing the voting circuitry within the feedback path of the circuit [3]. The simple addition
helped prevent synchronization problems and increased the reliability of the circuit (Figure 4).
Each of these designs was tested on their reliability with preventing SEUs. Table 1 depicts the
results from a series of tests on four different TMR designs.

9

Table 1 – Evaluation Results of TMR Designs

Design
(single clock)
No Redundancy
1 Voter
3 Voters
Feedback
Map Feedback

Simple Incrementer
LUTs
Failures Speed(MHz)
8
446
220
35(∼4x)
410
217(99%)
51(∼6x)
14
199(91%)
51(∼6x)
14
160(73%
27(∼3x)
15
194(88%)

Up/Down Loadable Counter
LUTs
Failures Speed (MHz)
10
463
220
41(∼4x)
484
217(99%)
57(∼6x)
14
213(97%)
57(∼6x)
15
157(72%)
N/A

Figure 4 – TMR Design with Feedback

Some recent design enchantments with TMR have been developed. There were three
new TMR techniques that were explored, Functional Triple Modular Redundancy (FTMR),
Selective Triple Modular Redundancy (STMR), and Partial Triple Modular Redundancy. FTMR
shows that both sequential and combinational blocks can be protected by means of TMR [4].
SMTR extends the basic TMR technique by identifying “sensitive” gates in the circuit and then
introduces TMR selectively at those gates [5]. Finally, Partial TMR extends STMR a bit but
gives priority to the circuit components which are more susceptible to persistent errors and
applies TMR to them [6].
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Each of these methods offers a more enhanced version of TMR. The current use of
TDTMR in this research utilized a few of the enhancements, but the main difference was using
three different logic designs instead of the three copies.
2.4 Fault Detection and Correction
Fault Detection and correction has always been a crucial aspect when it comes to digital
circuits. With a countless number of logical gates that continue to increase, it has become
virtually impossible to fully test every possible input combination for circuit designs for testing
purposes. A defect is an error introduced into a device during the manufacturing process. A
fault is said to be detected if a specific test pattern used with the primary inputs could detect the
specific fault and contain differing primary output results from the original design.
High level fault modeling provides the ability to use simulation based design verification.
Bridging faults, delay faults, stuck-at faults are the most popular fault models in digital testing at
this level [9]. The single ‘stuck-at’ fault model has been the most versatile fault model for
testing circuit logic. A stuck-at fault is assumed to affect only the interconnection between gates.
It shows if a circuit has ‘n’ signal lines, then there are potentially ‘2n’ ‘stuck-at’ faults within the
circuit. The goal would be to find a test pattern that could detect all possible faults for each
circuit design. Automatic Test Pattern Generation (ATPG) was developed in an effort to find
manufacturing defects along with finding a small number of test patterns that identify a high
number of possible faults.
ATPG is a testing method developed to locate a test sequence that allows the user to
differentiate between the correct circuit behavior and a faulty circuit. The goal of ATPG is to
find a set of test patterns which achieve the highest fault coverage. A pattern set with 100% fault
coverage consists of tests to detect every possible ‘stuck-at’ fault in a circuit. 100% fault
11

Table 2 – History of Algorithm Speedups [9]

Algorithm
D-ALG [551]
PODEM [258]
FAN [229, 232, 233]
TOPS [360]
SOCRATES [576]
Waicukauski et al.[708]
EST [110, 253]
TRAN [122]
Recursive learning [376]
Tafertshofer et al. [648]

Estimated speedup over D-Algorithm
(normalized to D-ALG CPU time)
1
7
23
292
1574 ATPG System
2189 ATPG System
8765 ATPG System
3005 ATPG System
485
25057

Year
1966
1981
1983
1987
1988
1990
1991
1993
1995
1997

coverage does not necessarily guarantee high quality, since other faults such as bridging or open
faults could still occur. There are cases when circuits containing faults can’t show up for any of
the input sequences generated. One case might have the fault be intrinsically undetectable
meaning that no test patterns exist that can detect that particular fault. These faults are redundant
in the sense that their presence does not influence the observable circuit functionality. Since the
ATPG problem is NP-complete, a problem that cannot be determined in a ‘practical’ amount of
time, there will also be cases where patterns exist but the ATPG algorithm gives up since it will
take a significant amount of time to find them [9].
Historically, there have been many algorithms developed in an effort to utilize test
patterns for circuit designs to test for faults. Testing these integrated circuits with significant
fault coverage has proven to be a daunting task due to its complexity. One of the earliest and
cornerstone algorithms used for ATPG today is the D-Algorithm. This algorithm provided the
building blocks necessary to cultivate faster and more efficient ATPG algorithms. Table 2
depicts a brief history of the algorithms used for ATPG with estimated speedup based on the DAlgorithm.
12

These algorithms employ heuristics that find all necessary signal assignments for a test as
early as possible. It has been shown that sequential circuits are far more complex than
combinational circuits to achieve considerable fault coverage. For combinational fault
simulation, the complexity is O(n2). Big Oh notation describes a growth rate as a simpler
function. For sequential fault simulation, the complexity is estimated to be between O(n2) and
O(n3) based on empirical measurements [9]. These algorithms have been employed to test for
defects on manufactured circuits and continue to be developed to find faster and more efficient
ways of detecting faults.
2.5 Fault Diagnosis
Faults are understood to be an abnormal change of system function or defect at the
component, equipment, or subsystem that may or may not lead to physical failure or breakdown
[10]. If faults occur, the outcome has the potential of being catastrophic by possibly endangering
lives. It is imperative that uncovering the location of faults is critical. Some traditional
approaches to fault diagnosis have been installing multiple sensors and hardware, analytical or
functional redundancy, and a combination of hardware and analytical redundancy [11].
The purpose of this research was to be able to implement a method of detecting and
diagnosing faults within the circuit while under radiation. Attempting to diagnose the location of
faults and errors on a circuit continues to be investigated thoroughly. Much of the recent
progress in fault diagnosis can be credited to the extensive use of fault equivalence to reduce the
number of fault conditions for analysis, since only one fault from each fault equivalence class
needs to be retained as a representative [12]. However, the difficulty still consists of finding
diagnostic methods which are suitable for real time execution.
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The goal of this research was to be able to use similar diagnosing methods and algorithms
to detect errors found within the circuit design and diagnose the location of the faults with the
best possible resolution. This means the fault was reduced to the minimum number of locations
that could be distinguished using stuck-at fault modeling. The information provided by this
diagnostic would provide the user the ability to better address the next action needed to be taken
to correct the problem. The following research attempts to uncover whether real time diagnosing
under radiation has the potential of being successful.
2.6 Radiation Effects on Electronics
Operational reliability is one of the key principal concerns in microelectronic systems.
This is particularly true of space bound systems since they are exposed to ionizing radiation and
their operating conditions do not allow for quick and easy restoration of failed or malfunctioning
components. The harsh space environment can cause severe damage and malfunction on
unprotected electronics. Trapped protons and electrons in the Earth’s radiation belts and cosmic
rays prove to be crucial challenges for space electronics to operate normally in this environment.
Long periods of time and exposure to space’s callous energy particles can degrade even the best
device’s performance, leading to component failure. Everything from major components to the
wiring and cabling of electronic devices can be seriously affected by radiation.
This section will explore key components of radiation effects on electronics related to the
research goals of this thesis. Three key issues are discussed further, total dose effect, single
event effects (SEE), and single event upsets.
2.6.1 Total Dose Effect
Electronic devices in space suffer long-term radiation effects, mostly due to electrons and
protons. Total dose effects refers to the integrated radiation dose that is accumulated by space
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electronics over a certain period of time and can reduce mission lifetimes due to long-term
damage to devices, ICs, or solar cells. Long-term exposure can cause device threshold shifts,
increased device leakage and power consumption, timing changes, and decreased functionality
[13]. After the exposure to sufficient total-dose radiation, most insulating materials such as
capacitor dielectrics, circuit-board materials, and cabling insulators, become less insulating or
become more electrically leaky along with certain conductive materials, such as metal-film
resistors, can change their characteristics under exposure to total-dose radiation [14]. These
changes may not be constant with time after irradiation and may depend on the dose rate at
which the radiation is received.
The radiation damage in the silicon dioxide layers consists of three components: the
buildup of trapped charge in the oxide, an increase in the number of interface traps, and an
increase in the number of bulk oxide traps [15]. The ionizing radiation primarily affects the gate
and field oxide layers. In CMOS devices, the gate oxide becomes ionized by the dose it absorbs
and ionization produces electron-hole pairs in insulation layers. The electrons have high
mobility, but the holes have lower mobility. The free electrons and holes drift under the
influence of the electric field that is induced in the oxide by the gate voltage. The holes that
escape “initial” recombination transport through the oxide toward the silicon and silicon dioxide
interface by hopping through localized states in the oxide [16]. A small number of holes become
trapped in the gate oxide. Trapped charge in the oxide and at interface regions changes the
threshold voltage and mobility of the gate and field-oxide transistors, therefore modifying their
characteristics [23]. The accumulated charge can be high enough to keep the transistors
permanently open or closed, having the source drain current no longer be controlled by the gate
leading to device failure. Trapped holes are not stable, they gradually anneal with time. The
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overall effect depends on bias conditions and device technology. With devices becoming
smaller, the gate oxides in these shrinking transistors are growing thinner. Being thinner, the
gate oxide traps less positive charge overall [14]. Therefore, transistors with smaller
technologies are becoming inherently more radiation resistant. Figure 5 shows how the total
dose effects the threshold voltage and causes a shift in both ‘n’ and ‘p’ transistors. The threshold
voltage does change during the annealing process after it has been irradiated shown in Figure 6.

Figure 5 – Threshold Voltage of ‘n’ and ‘p’ Transistors during Irradiation [15]

Figure 6 – Irradiation and Annealing Effects [15]
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Since the number of electron-hole pairs generated is directly proportional to the amount
of energy absorbed by the device material, the total damage is also roughly proportional to the
total dose of radiation received by the device [15].
2.6.2 Single Event Effects
Another important category of radiation effects that an integrated circuit is vulnerable to
are Single Event Effects (SEE). A SEE occurs when a single high-energy particle strikes a
device, leaving behind an ionized track and can lead to sudden device or system failure (Figure
7). These failures result from the charge deposited by a single particle crossing a sensitive
region in the device and are a function of the amount of charge collected at the sensitive node
and the node state [13]. The ionization along the path of the impinging particle collects at a
circuit node. The ionized track contains equal numbers of electrons and holes and is therefore
electrically neutral.

Figure 7 – Cosmic Ray Through the Strain of a NMOS Transistor

The total number of charges is proportional to the linear energy transfer of the incoming particle.
Every memory device has a certain critical charge which could result in a SEE or other
undesirable phenomenon [14]. The three largest categories of SEEs are Single Event Upsets
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(SEU), Single Event Latch-up (SEL), and Single Event Burnout (SEB). The soft error or upset
(SEU) is a change in the information stored on the circuit. A hard error is characterized by
permanent or semi- permanent damage such as the latch-up (SEL) or the burnout (SEB).
Another source of SEEs is impurities in the device material. There might be traces of uranium or
thorium, which both are naturally radioactive elements, decaying by alpha emissions. The alpha
particle can then release its charge and cause a SEE.
In the space environment, circuit designers have been concerned with both the protons
and cosmic rays that lead to a greatly increased SEE rate. For cosmic rays, SEEs are typically
caused by its heavy ion component. These cosmic rays can easily penetrate the structure of an
integrated circuit. Cosmic rays may be galactic or solar in origin. Protons, usually trapped in the
earth's radiation belts or from solar flares, may cause direct ionization SEEs in very sensitive
devices. However, a proton may typically cause a nuclear reaction near a sensitive device area
creating an indirect ionization effect potentially causing a SEE.
2.6.3 Single Event Upsets
A cosmic ray, or a secondary ion released via a high-energy proton-induced nuclear
reaction, can deposit enough energy within a sensitive node that an integrated circuit can be
upset. These single event upsets (SEUs) are analogous to soft errors in electronics or avionics
due to energetic alpha particles or atmospheric neutrons. SEU is defined by NASA as
"radiation-induced errors in microelectronic circuits caused when charged particles (usually from
the radiation belts or from cosmic rays) lose energy by ionizing the medium through which they
pass, leaving behind a wake of electron-hole pairs." A SEU usually manifests itself as a state
change or "bit-flip" of a single data bit or memory cell that causes a momentary glitch in the
device output (Figure 8).
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Figure 8 – Example of SEU

If enough of these upsets occur, or if a single critical node is affected, a reset or rewriting
of the device results in normal device behavior would be required. Single-event upsets occur in
computer memories, microprocessors, controllers, and almost any digital circuit containing
memory elements. They do not cause lasting damage to the device, but may cause lasting
problems to a system which cannot recover from such an error. Also, in very sensitive devices, a
single ion hits two or more bits causing simultaneous errors, known as multiple-bit upsets
(MBUs), in adjacent memory cells. As the minimum device feature size is down scaled to
smaller and smaller dimensions, the susceptibility to such SEU’s has been found to increase
remarkably [15].
Research and mitigation techniques within this field have been growing significantly.
New methods and studies have been investigated in order to try to lower the number of possible
SEU on a circuit at a given time. An alternative approach to reducing SEU and transient upset
levels, as well as eliminating the possibilities of latch-up, is to use silicon on sapphire or silicon
on insulator technologies to build CMOS circuits [15]. Other methods have been using the
hardened by design methodology i.e. Tripler Modular Redundancy. It is with these mitigation
techniques and research where these phenomena could be carefully investigated to better
understand and predict when these upsets could occur with space electronics.
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2.7 Gamma Radiation Source
The cobalt-60
60 isotope (Co
(Co-60)
60) was used as the source of ionizing radiation for this
experiment. Co-60
60 undergoes beta decay with a half
half-life
life of 5.24 years releasing two gamma
particles and one electron, demonstrated in Fi
Figure 9.

Figure 9 – Decay scheme of 60Co [20]

Ohio State University (OSU) Nuclear Reactor Lab (NRL) in Columbus, Ohio provided a
Co-60
60 source. A simplified diagram showing the gamma irradiator can be found in Figure 10. It
contains a six inch wide aluminum
num tube containing a movable platform that can be raised and
lowered out of the irradiator. The gamma irradiator cell itself sits on the bottom of a pool of
water and consists of 14 Co-60
60 sources evenly spread around the aluminum tube.

Figure 10 – Co-60 Gamma Irradiator Layout [17]
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When the device under test (DUT) is lowered into the tube, the radiation dose rate is
based on the location of the device relative to the center of the Co
Co-60
60 source rods. However, the
dose rate curve is based on the distance of the DUT above the bottom of the moveable platform
when the platform is resting on the bottom of the aluminum tube [17]. The radiation dose curve
provided by OSUNRL is depicted in Figure 111.

Figure 111 – Dose Rate of Co-60 Irradiator [21]

2.8 Thermal Radiation Source
A 1600W Xe lamp thermal simulator was used for the irradiation of the DUT in this
thesis. The schematic shown below (Figure 112)) is accurate with the exception that the thermal
simulator used in these experiments had an output direction rotated 90 degrees so that the output
was perpendicular to the major axis of the thermal simulator producing a horizontal beam [18].

21

Figure 112 – Schematic of 1600 W Solar Simulator

The thermal simulator was assembled by Koehl [19] and the manufacturer recorded a spectral
output seen in Figure 13 below.

Figure 13 – Spectral Output from 1600W Thermal Simulator

The spectrum is largely a smooth Plankian distribution, reflecting the source plasma temperature
with superimposed lines from the xe
xenon
non emission spectrum. The smooth Plankian portion of the
distribution is similar to the measured intensities for a 1 kT nuclear explosion [19].
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2.9 Previous Work
Research with this topic has been performed in the last few years. The work presented
with the last two AFIT theses has been inconclusive. There were many problems that were fixed
from the previous work along with a significant contribution by real time detection and
diagnosing.
The original code developed for evaluating circuits under radiation was not operational.
The next version’s code was primitive and could not offer any real, solid conclusion. The
pervious hardware constructed for communication between the two boards was suboptimal and
unusable. The efforts in building TMR on the base level was not implemented properly because
the code was written and optimized by Xilinx and not built structurally. The monitoring system
for collecting errors was not actually accounting items in real time. It polled the system in
intervals that the max speed for RS232 could perform at.
Not everything in the work done previously was completely inconclusive. Results from
previous work suggested that the baseboard was the cause of most of the errors in the result. The
results also demonstrated that dose rate versus total dose could be significant. Both works
performed previously made an attempt to characterize the effects of radiation on electronics but
failed to fully implement a capable measuring system.
The current research corrected these problems. The testing platform utilized ribbon
cables, buffers, and capacitors to correctly implement a bridge between the two FPGA boards.
TDTMR was implemented structurally and laid out onto the mini module FX12 series board
(Figure 14). The monitoring system was only used to see the results. The actual data that was
measured was written to a flash device in real time. Further detail of the implementation of this
research is described in the following chapter.
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Figure 14 – Layout of the 3 Adders on the FX12 Board

2.10 Summary
This chapter provides a quick background in key areas that are being investigated in this
research. There are many fault redundancy techniques that are used in a variety of forms in
research. This particular research focuses on TMR. Radiation effects on electronics also have a
very large and comprehensive background. A full understanding and explanation of these effects
still remains a bit of a mystery. The previous two AFIT researchers in this area did not
completely cover the most basic concepts. Their attempts did produce a few benefits, in the long
run there were too many errors to take any work that was accomplished and build upon it. All
the work done for this thesis was rebuilt from the ground up. The goal was to correct these
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mistakes and expand on the concepts of radiation effects on electronics. Further research into
these areas can be found through the references in the bibliography.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Chapter Overview
This section describes the entire methodology used to accomplish the evaluation of the
testing platform, the detection and diagnosis algorithm and TDTMR. The first section breaks
down each portion of the testing platform. A description of the methodology used to create the
detection and diagnosis algorithm is described in this chapter. Each test set up for the
experiment was also included. Further descriptions and diagrams can also be found in the
Appendix.
3.2 Test Platform
The overall testing platform was broken into three parts: the controller unit which houses
all the command logic along with the processing of data for the diagnosis algorithm, the TMR
unit or Device Under Test (DUT) which describes the circuitry being evaluated under radiation,
and the external devices which monitors and records all the information being processed.

Figure 15 – Block Diagram of Testing Platform

3.2.1 TMR Design
The FPGA device under test (DUT) for these radiation experiments was the Xilinx Virtex
4 FX12 Series Mini-module mounted on an Avnet Mini-Module Baseboard, pictured in Figure
16. The FPGA contained 90nm transistor technology with 10 layers of metal interconnects and
triple oxide technology running internally at 1.2 Volts (V) [22]. A more complete description of
the Virtex 4 Mini Module can be found in Appendix A.
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Figure 16 – DUT Virtex 4 Mini-Module

The DUT component consisted of the new Triple Design TMR. The design also utilized
the triplicated voter enhancement [2]. The DUT contains three copies of different forms of adder
logic. The Carry Look Ahead Adder and Ripple Carry Adder designs were implemented
structurally using base level gates. The two adder diagrams can be found in Appendix B and C.
The third adder was implemented in a behavior method, meaning it was left to the Xilinx
software to layout how the adder would be designed. The three adder’s results entered the
triplicated voter logic in an effort to perform fault redundancy. The outputs of each adder were
also sent to the controller board along with the results of the triplicated voter logic. Figure 17
shows the design of the entire TDTMR Unit.

Figure 17 – Diagram of TDTMR
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Other components were also added to the DUT as well, for testing purposes. A clock
generator and an error generator were also added in the DUT (Figure 18). These units were used
to simulate fault injections into the design. A fault injection is an error purposefully implanted
into the integrated circuit that can be controlled by a user or automated through a computer
program with specific guidelines.

Figure 18 – Diagram of DUT

The error unit generated errors at different timing intervals to simulate single errors into
the TDTMR. These generated errors would lie dormant unless activated by a switch from the
base board. Upon activation it would generate four errors at four different timing intervals, one
microsecond, one millisecond, two seconds, and eight seconds.
The overall goal of this research was to radiate just the Virtex 4 chip without the
baseboard. To help eliminate other possible errors and isolate the chip itself, specialized
connector cables (Figure 19) were constructed to allow just the chip to be placed under radiation
and keep the base board protected from any possible radiation damage. No buffers were needed
to have the chip be fully functional. With the current cables, the chip itself can be two feet away
from the base board without any problems with timing and synchronization.
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Figure 19 – Connector Cables between Chip and Baseboard

3.2.2 Controller Board
The Virtex-II Pro development system was the FPGA chosen to implement the controller
board logic. It contains a PowerPC Processor which was used in the compilation of the
diagnostic algorithm. 130 nm technology was also used with this board along with nine layers of
metal. Output pins where soldered onto the board to provide the ability to utilize ribbon cables.
Figure 20 shows the Virtex-II Pro board. Further description of the Virtex-II Pro can be found in
Appendix D.
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Figure 20 – Virtex-II Pro Controller Board

VHSIC Hardware Description Language (VHDL) controlled the basic flow of how the
hardware operated. A state machine was developed in VHDL on the controller board to run the
basic operations. Figure 21 shows the state diagram used for the controller board.

Figure 21 – State Diagram of Controller Board

The remaining parts of the controller logic was written in C and utilized by the PowerPC. The
controller board cycles through vectors of nine bits for the input that come from a counter or
random module. These two modules can be interchanged during runtime by the user. A copy of
the DUT circuit is also placed in the controller board and acts as the ‘golden circuit’ for
comparison purposes. All the values from the DUT were compared to the ‘golden circuit’
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results. Figure 22 illustrates the block diagram of the controller logic. Upon detecting an error,
the controller board automatically switches to ‘Diagnostic Mode’ which has all the test and
diagnostic vectors chosen as inputs. The PowerPC also runs the algorithm that calculates the
location of the error. This will be discussed further in this chapter.
Test
Vectors

Diagnostic
Vectors

Counter
Module

Random
Module

CONTROL LOGIC
To / From
DUT

Gold
Circuit

Power PC

To External
Devices

Figure 22 – Controller Board Block Diagram

3.2.3 External Devices
The two external devices used for the test platform is a laptop attached to the Virtex-II
Pro board via RS232 (serial) cable and a compact flash card which is on the board.
Hyper-terminal was used to communicate with the controller board. The hyper-terminal
acted as a monitor of all the operations. A user can check the number of errors detected, how
long it’s been running, how many vectors have been checked, and some of the input vectors with
its results from all the outputs. Since the controller board operates significantly faster than what
the hyper-terminal can output, the input vectors and output results are randomly chosen for
display. The user can also change to four different modes through the hyper-terminal, namely
counter, random, test, and debug. Figure 23 shows what the monitoring screen would look like.
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Figure 23 – Hyper-Terminal Monitoring Screen

The compact flash card was utilized to record all the data in real time for possible post
processing analysis. Due to the volume of vectors being analyzed, only when presented with an
error would information be logged onto the flash card. The flash card recorded which input
vector caused a failure along with that vector’s results. It also documented all the results from
each of the test and diagnostic vectors. Figure 24 shows an example of what the output on the
flash card would look like.

Figure 24 – Output of the Flash Card

The card would record the vector ID, the vector source, all the outputs of the adder and
voter, the gold circuit, the input vectors, and the time of when the vector was executed. The
FPGA would write to a buffer, a temporary file, for two hundred kilobytes worth before writing
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it out to flash. This process was done in case of an error or problem that potentially causes the
FPGA to crash. If there was a failure while writing to flash, everything written into the buffer
would all be lost or corrupted. The smaller files allow less data to be lost in case of a crash.
3.2.4 Buffer Bridge
The Virtex 4 Mini-Module was originally chosen for its size to fit down a pipe under
radiation. To communicate between the two boards, ribbon cable was used. Due to the
incompatibility of the two boards to match the same pin layout, a bridge board needed to be
constructed (Figure 25).

Figure 25 – Bridge Board

The bridge board also serves as a buffer to clean up the signal degradation between the
two boards. Since there would be fifteen feet of cable between the controller board and the
DUT, high speed CMOS buffers were used to aid in cleaning up the signal. Full details and
specifications of the high speed CMOS buffers can be found in Appendix E. Figure 26 displays
the comparisons of the signals with and without the CMOS buffers after fifteen feet. Another
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addition to the bridge board was to use IC sockets with capacitors. These sockets also aided in
cleaning up the signal. Appendix F contains the specs of these sockets.

Figure 26 – Signal Comparisons

3.3 Operation Speed
The Virtex-II Pro Power PC has the ability to operate at clock speeds of 300 MHz and the
Virtex 4 Mini-Module can operate at 100 MHz. The Virtex-II Pro board itself can operate at 100
MHz. In order to get the two boards to properly communicate with each other, the speed of each
board had to be reduced. The biggest hurdle was due to the distance of the two boards. Using a
clock pulse and the oscilloscope, measurements were made with fifteen feet of cable. With the
two boards needing to be fifteen feet apart, the boards with the aid of the buffer board were able
to sustain a clean square pulse at 1 MHz.
Due to the nature of the diagnostic algorithm and the predetermined vector sets
(explained later in this thesis), a bottle neck developed between the Power PC and the Virtex-II
Pro. The instantiated hardware required more processing time to handle the code from the Power
PC. Thus, delay was added to the Power PC processing to allow the Virtex II-Pro to execute all
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its commands and still be in synch. An attempt was made to investigate this problem further;
however, no concrete solution was discovered in time. This bottle neck caused the code to not
reach the potential of 1 MHz or one million vectors per second. With the current code in place,
the system can operate on average only 2,817 vectors per second. Possible enhancements are
noted in the future works section of this thesis.
3.4 Fault Detection and Diagnosis
This section describes the process and methodology used to come up with the fault
detection and diagnosis algorithm. The method used to detect faults was similar to previous
work done in this field [17] with a few differences. The diagnosis algorithm was developed by
utilizing the TESTCAD test generation and fault simulation tool sets. The full algorithm flow
chart is displayed in Figure 27.
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Figure 27 – Fault Detection and Diagnosis Algorithm

3.4.1 Fault Detection
The algorithm runs a simple loop of generating inputs and checking the outputs. The
controller board generates one of the 2N possible input combinations, ‘N’ representing the
number of inputs, to be put through the DUT. With nine inputs, there are possible 29 or 512
unique input combinations. Once the controller board receives the results of the input vector
after it has travelled to the DUT, it performs a bitwise comparison on the results of the three
adders and the voter logic to the ‘gold circuit’. The bitwise comparison determines which adder
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caused an error and which bit of that particular adder was wrong. The error sends an interrupt to
the processor to begin the diagnosis of the error.
3.4.2 Fault Diagnosis
The process of diagnosing the exact location of faults within a circuit was a two step
process. The first step was to utilize the TESTCAD test generation and fault simulation tool set
in order to develop the test vector and the individual fault list. The second step after creating
these lists, an algorithm was developed to detect the fault location with the best possible
resolution for stuck-at fault modeling.
3.4.2.1 Test Vector Generation
Due to creating the adders structurally, it made the creation of the fault list easier. The
TESTCAD tools allowed for the creation of all the possible faults that could be found in a
structural design along with fully optimizing and reducing the fault list by equivalence and then
by dominance. The fault reduction was able to reduce the number of possible faults by 16-18%.
The TESTCAD tools evaluated the circuit combined with the fault list and were able to provide
100% fault efficiency. This meant that all the faults within a circuit were detected. The next
goal was to find out how many faults a vector was able to uncover. Each of the 2N possible input
combinations were simulated individually to list all the possible fault locations it detected that
associated with that particular input vector. Appendix G has a brief description of all the
TESTCAD tool commands.
The data collected from the TESTCAD tools were tabulated and placed in a giant table.
Figure 28 depicts a small portion of the table that indicates all the fault locations found with each
test vector along the ‘x’ axis and their respective vector outputs along the ‘y’ axis. A full
detailed list containing all the vectors, faults, and detectable faults can be found in Appendix H.
37

Figure 28 – Layout of Detected Faults

Each individual test vector was able to detect on average thirty faults. The final goal was
to reduce the number of vectors to the least amount that would still cover every possible error.
The table was sorted by each of the output bits. This showed that there were a lot of redundant
test vectors. After eliminating all the redundant vectors, around twenty-four vectors remained.
The average number of faults detected by each vector for each output bit reduced to eight. From
here, the list of test vectors, diagnostic vectors, and their particular fault lists were made. These
lists of vectors and their respective fault list were stored on the controller board.
3.4.2.2 Diagnosis Algorithm
With the test vectors and fault lists stored on the controller board, an algorithm was
developed in an effort to detect the location of a single fault with the best possible resolution. By
following a similar methodology of Deductive Fault Simulation [9], an inverse deductive fault
detection algorithm was developed.
The goal of this algorithm was to diagnose a single fault in the entire system. Upon
determining which adder and which bit caused the error, the algorithm would choose the
appropriate test vector list and fault list to start inverse deductive fault detection. A possible
fault list array was created and populated with values of ‘1’ which represent the possible location
of faults. Each of the test and diagnostic vectors would process through the system and the
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results would be evaluated. Pending on passing or failing, would determine how the elimination
process of the fault list array would be conducted. The algorithm would continue in a loop until
only one error remained or the end of the list has been reached. If more than one fault remained
at the end of the list, it was determined that there was no possible way to distinguish the single
fault amongst them all. The remaining faults would be the best possible resolution for fault
diagnosis.
The possibility of having multiple bit failures did present an issue. The current
algorithm’s scope to diagnose the location of faults expects to have only one bit failure.
However, when multiple bit failures were present, the algorithm runs through a set of test vectors
without attempting to perform the diagnosis algorithm. The results are stored on the flash card to
perform post processing analysis.
3.5 Test Setup
The ultimate goal for this research was to test the algorithm under a form of radiation. To
verify the validity of the algorithm, different test set ups were created. Hardware fault injection,
gamma radiation, and thermal radiation were the testing environments. Each setup utilized the
test platform in its entirety.
3.5.1 Injected Fault Setup
The setup for this test was conducted in an open lab. It utilized the same full test
platform described above. Four faults were injected in random locations in the structural design
of the adders. The error generator rotates through the four different faults one at a time for
specific durations. The test platform executed for seventy two hours straight with no errors to
exercise its durability and duration. Fault injections were manually simulated randomly
throughout the testing process.
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3.5.2 Gamma Radiation Test Setup
The test platform was originally constructed to be tested under gamma radiation at the
OSUNRL. The DUT was separated from the base board and placed eight inches from the
bottom based on Figure 10 to achieve the highest dose rate per hour (see Chapter 2). The base
board was strapped above the DUT separated by a thick piece of lead to be protected from the
radiation. The bridge board, controller board, and the remaining devices stayed fifteen feet
above the reactor. Figure 29 depicts the entire set up used for the gamma radiation test.

Figure 29 – Gamma Radiation Test Setup

3.5.3 Thermal Radiation Test Setup
Thermal Radiation was chosen as another form to generate errors on the DUT. In a
previous thesis [19], a Newport Xe Solar Simulator was assembled with the ability to provide 3.3
cal/cm2s irradiance. Figure 30 depicts the set up used for this irradiation test.
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Figure 30 – Thermal Radiation Test Setup

A two inch diameter fused silica Plano convex lens was inserted 95 mm after the
focusing optic of the setup. The focal length of the second external optic is 150 mm. However,
to increase the homogeneity of the beam, the target was placed closer to the second external
optic than the focal length [18]. A pinhole was constructed that was placed in between the two
inch Silica Lens and the FPGA to ensure the focus of the thermal radiation onto the FPGA alone.
Figure 31 provides a diagram with detailed specification of the entire set up.

Figure 31 – Thermal Radiation Specification Setup
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3.5.4 Optical Laser Test Setup
Using a COTS laser pen to cause errors was another test. The test setup consisted of a
laser pointer, a pinhole plate, and the DUT. All the lasers were green in color with a wavelength
of 532 nm. Three different wattage laser pens were used in an attempt to create errors. The
three lasers had wattages of 10 mW, 20 mW, and 50 mW. The cover of the FPGA on the DUT
was removed for this test. The pinhole plate was 600 micrometers in diameter.
The laser pointer was setup with the pinhole over the laser to get a more focused target
onto the uncovered FPGA. The distance to the FPGA was 73 mm. Each laser was focused on
one corner of the FPGA. Figure 32 depicts the entire set up used for the optical laser test.

Figure 32 – Optical Laser Test Setup

3.5.5 Optical Flash Test Setup
The last test setup used for this research that was available was the optical flash test. The
goal of this test was to see if the Electrical Magnetic Interference (EMI) of a professional,
camera flash device would cause errors on the DUT. Figure 33 depicts how the test setup was
arranged.
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Figure 333 – Optical Flash Test Setup

The flash device was controlled digitally through the concept in photography known as
F-stop. F-stops are powers of

. The first ƒ stop is

, or ƒ/1. Next is

, or ƒ/1.4, then

for ƒ/2, etc [24]. For each increment of ff-stop number the output wattage
ttage doubles. f/1 starts
with output wattage of 18.75, f/2’s output wattage is 37.5, f/3’s output wattage is 75, and so
forth.
Three different DUT tests were conducted. One was with a brand new mini module with
no modifications. The other two tests us
used
ed another brand new module with the outer most
protective plate removed. One of those setups had the DUT completely exposed to the flash.
The other setup used a 600 micrometer pinhole to focus the flash onto one part of the exposed
DUT.
3.6 Summary
The previous chapter describes the entire process to develop the test platform and all the
components associated with it. A description of the development of the test and diagnostic
vectors was discussed and how they were derived, set up, and implemented. The entire detection
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and diagnosing algorithm was also described in this chapter. Each of the five test setups that
were used are described in detail on how they were constructed for testing the goals of this
research. Further code, diagrams, specifications sheets, and other pertinent information can be
found in the Appendix.
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IV. Results & Analysis
4.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter covers all the results and analysis performed for this research as described in
the previous methodology chapter. Each section covers all the results from all the test setups
used to obtain errors.
4.2 Test Setup Results
The five subsections describe the results gathered from each of the five tests. Some tests
were more successful than others. A detailed account of each experiment was recorded and
written out in this chapter.
4.2.1 Injected Fault Results
The results for this hardware simulation test setup were completed. The objective of
locating the fault within the circuit and be able to diagnose the location of that particular fault in
real time were achieved. The four hardware injected faults were located with the best resolution
through the algorithm described in Chapter 3. The algorithm was able to pinpoint the exact
location of the fault that was randomly placed in the structural design of either the Ripple Carry
Adder (Figure 34) or the Carry Look Ahead Adder (Figure 35). Three of the four faults were
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Figure 34 – Injected Fault Locations for Ripple Carry Adder

Figure 35 – Injected Fault Locations for Carry Look Ahead Adder

detected and the diagnostic algorithm pinpointed them exactly on the circuit diagram. One of the
faults was not able to be located exactly; however, the algorithm reduced the number of possible
locations to three. This result cannot uniquely distinguish amongst the three faults without fully
46

destroying the circuit. Using this method, it is the best possible solution that can be found.
Figure 36 shows the results printed in the flash device depicting how the algorithm reduces the
number of faults in an effort to pinpoint the exact fault.

Figure 36 – Injected Fault Results

The circled result is represented in HEX. Each HEX number represents four fault locations. The
first result of 00000019 depicts that there are three possible fault locations the algorithm located.
The second result of 00000020 represents the exact location of the fault uncovered.
4.2.1.1 Analysis
These results prove that the inverse deductive algorithm for fault detection and diagnosis
worked. The algorithm correctly detected each of the injected fault locations individually and
properly reduced the number of possible fault locations to the best possible solution. These
faults were each injected one at a time. The algorithm’s goal was to detect single errors within a
circuit but also takes into account multiple errors. However, it is not able to fully diagnose the
exact location of multiple errors. The algorithm performs a set of test vectors and post
processing analysis was done.
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4.2.2 Gamma Radiation Results
Four separate tests were conducted at the OSUNRL. The first test used a Spartan series
chip that was separated from the baseboard. The maximum dose rate of 69 krad(Si)/hr was set
based on the dose rate curve found in Chapter 2. No errors were detected for the first fifteen
hours, but soon after, the chip experienced a catastrophic failure and no values were obtained.
The chip itself was damaged beyond repair and not able to be reprogrammed.
In an effort to cause errors, the next three tests kept the baseboard and the DUT attached.
The first test lasted for forty-eight minutes before it was removed from radiation. The result log
showed a sporadic array of random results with no consistent outcome. All the adders and voter
logic produced multiple random results. There were no clear, traceable set of results obtained in
the result logs. After pulling the DUT from radiation, the baseboard was damaged and
inoperable. However, despite the damaged baseboard, the DUT remained operational. Figure 37
shows a portion of the log of the errors from this test. The full results are similar to the portion
displayed in this figure.

Figure 37 – Gamma Radiation Test 2,3 Results

The third test was set up in a similar fashion as the second test. This test lasted for an
hour and nineteen minutes before numerous errors showed up. The third test lasted longer but
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the results within the log were the same as Figure 36. Aside from the duration of this test, the
only other difference between the two tests was Test 3’s baseboard and DUT were no longer
operational. Test 2’s DUT was still operational.
The final test for gamma radiation was met with differing results. The device was raised
to seventeen inches from the bottom of the radiation chamber. By raising the distance, the dose
rate is effectively reduced to 35 krad(Si)/hr based on Figure 11 found in Chapter 2. After two
and three quarter hours, the baseboard and the DUT were still operational after being pulled from
the radiation event. There were a total of thirty-four errors that were traceable coming in three
groups of time. Figure 38 shows the timeline for all four tests for gamma radiation along with
the group of errors detected in Test 4.
Test 3
Pulled

Test 2
Pulled

0

Test 4
Pulled

1

2

Test 4
Errors 1-7

Test 1
Pulled

3

15

Time (hr)

Test 4
Errors 17-34

Test 4
Errors 7-17

Figure 38 – Gamma Radiation Timeline

The three groups of errors, based on the logs, were consistent and traceable. It appeared
that the voting logic produced errors at bit zero. The results showed that bit zero of the voting
logic was a stuck-at-zero fault meaning a value in the output remained zero for a period of time.
Table 3 presents an example of how the results represent a bit stuck at zero. Finally, Table 4
shows a summary of all four test results taken during the gamma radiation test.
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Table 3 – Stuck at Zero Faults

Behave Adder
D – 1101
3 – 0011
9 – 1001

CLA Adder
D – 1101
3 – 0011
9 – 1001

RC Adder
D – 1101
3 – 0011
9 – 1001

Voter
C – 1100
2 – 0010
8 – 1000

Gold Circuit
D – 1101
3 – 0011
9 – 1001

Table 4 – Gamma Radiation Results Summary
Baseboard Does Rate Duration Baseboard
DUT
Vectors Checked
(hrs)
Operational Operational
* 1000
Test # Chip Type Attached (krad(Si)/hr)

1
2
3
4

Spartan 3
FX (1)
FX (2)
FX (3)

No
Yes
Yes
Yes

69
69
69
35

15
0.8667
1.333
2.75

Yes
No
No
Yes

No
Yes
No
Yes

150861
7269
15482
26470

4.2.2.1 Analysis
The overall results from the gamma radiation test showed that the test platform created
for this test was successful. The detection portion of the algorithm of determining if errors
existed proved successful. In Test 1 the catastrophic failure of the chip rendered the results
inconclusive. However, the test did show that the separated DUT with its smaller technology (90
nm) was more resilient to gamma radiation. By having smaller technology, the gate oxide traps
less positive charge overall. With less trapped charges due to radiation, the transistors have a
better change of operating normally. Test 2 and 3 confirmed that the baseboard is more
susceptible to gamma radiation than the DUT itself as shown in previous work [17]. One could
speculate that the cause for this would be the baseboard was not designed for volatile
environments. The designers were not interested in creating a board to withstand gamma
radiation rather than to just provide a connection port for the DUT.
The final test showed that the algorithm was able to track the single bit error in the voting
logic. However, it was not able to diagnose the error because it would disappear on average
0.00069 seconds. The logs were able to track thirty four errors before pulling the device out of
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Table 5 – Thermal Radiation Results Summary

Test #
1
2
3
4

Chip
Type
FX(1)
FX(2)
FX(3)
FX(4)

Duration
(mins:secs)
11:07
13:06
18:39
21:35

Start Temp Peak Temp Final Output
(C°)
(C°)
Wattage
34.8
440.9
1800
36.1
392.7
1350
42.8
298.1
1300
35.5
301.8
1290

the radiation. The results show that the number of errors for each ‘grouping’ increased over
time. This would be expected since the DUT has been constantly exposed to gamma radiation.
If the device would have remained in radiation, the results had the potential to show that more
errors would occur due to the voltage threshold dropping as in Figure 9 (Chapter 2) while in
radiation.
The tests performed with gamma radiation do suggest that there might be a difference
between total ionizing dose and dose rate. The two tests with the highest dose rate failed faster
than the board with half the dose rate and under radiation with more than doubled the amount of
time than the other two tests. This would be similar to skin exposure to the sun’s harmful UV
rays. On a bright sunny day with no form of protection, skin has a higher chance of being
damaged in a period of one hour than a cloudy day in a period of two hours. Skin would be
exposed to similar total amounts of UV rays but the one in direct sunlight can potentially cause
more immediate damage. In the end, the total dose rate does have an effect on the threshold
voltage. As shown in Figure 4 (Chapter 2), the threshold voltage could have shifted causing the
set of errors from Test 4 to appear and then disappear in groups. More tests would be needed to
verify this, but there are promising results from the outcome of this test setup.
4.2.3 Thermal Radiation Results
An attempt to expose the DUT to thermal (heat) radiation was another test in an effort to
detect errors. Four tests were conducted on four separate DUTs. Table 5 shows a summary of
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the results of all four tests for thermal radiation. The duration column indicates how long it took
before complete chip failure. The first two tests were conducted by increasing the wattage
quickly over a shorter period of time. The results for the first two tests had catastrophic failure at
higher temperatures. The log did show that there were errors in the voting logic at bit one before
completely failing all together with all outputs being zero. Between the first two tests there were
more than a dozen single voter errors spanning five hundred milliseconds before everything
failed.
The last two tests had the output wattage slowly increase over a longer span of time.
With this test, the chip failed around 300°C. Though the chip took longer to fail and had lower
temperatures, no traceable errors were able to be detected. The FX series chip was only rated for
temperatures in the range of zero to eighty-five degrees Celsius. In the end due to this fact, the
chip catastrophically failed having results of all zeros for the output.
4.2.3.1 Analysis
The results for this test again showed that the voter logic was the first to fail before any of
the adders. Due to the law of thermal equilibrium, a direct pinpoint form of thermal radiation
could not be achieved. The entire body of the DUT would heat up to roughly the same
temperature of the directed pinpoint of the beam. In semiconductors, electrical conductivity
increases with increasing temperature. Silicon’s thermal conductivity is only three hundred
Kelvin which is equivalent to twenty-seven degrees Celsius. One could speculate that with the
quick ramp up of wattage thermal equilibrium was not fully reached allowing the chip to achieve
higher temperatures before failing. The high temperatures did not fully diffuse across the DUT
possibly causing partial damage. Once the rest of the chip caught up with the focal point of the
beam, the entire chip completely failed.
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Table 6 – Optical Laser Results Summary

Test # Chip Type Duration (min) Laser (mW) Errors
1
FX(1)
45
10
None
2
FX(1)
45
20
None
3
FX(1)
45
50
None

The other tests had the increase of temperature ramped up more slowly. These tests did
not have any constructive results. The chip failed completely by having a short created due to
the heat. The slow method of increasing the temperature allowed for thermal equilibrium across
the entire chip before stepping to the next level. By waiting longer, the entire chip would have
the same temperature and allow it to fail completely without damaging a portion of the chip first.
In the end, the results for this test did show that the system was able to detect some single errors
before completely crashing.
4.2.4 Optical Laser Results
An attempt to cause errors on the DUT was to use a laser pointer. Three tests were
conducted with each of the three lasers. Table 6 depicts the results gathered from the
experiment. The lasers were focused onto the same corner of the DUT where a few of the
outputs would have been located. After forty-five minutes, it was determined that the test would
not cause any errors.
4.2.4.1 Analysis
After careful examination of the DUT, it was determined another metal plate was there to
protect the innermost logic of the FPGA. Without permanently damaging the chip itself,
attempts through chemicals and small blades to remove the second metal plate turned up
fruitless. The possibility that the laser could create enough heat to cause thermal conductivity
producing errors was considered. However, since the lasers were COTS, the laser was not able

53

Table 7 – Optical Flash Results Summary

Test # Chip Type
1
FX(1)
2
FX(2)
3

FX(2)

Flash Output
(W)
600 (Max)
18.75(Min)

Covering
Yes
No Lid

Results
None
Crashed

428.4

No Lid /
600um pinhole

Crashed

to last long enough due to batteries. It was concluded that the laser test would not be able to
induce any errors on the DUT with the second metal plate in place.
4.2.5 Optical Flash Results
This was the last test that was performed and available. The goal of this test was to use a
flash to cause Electrical Magnetic Interference (EMI) to the DUT. Table 7 is a summary of the
results collected from each test.
The first test used a brand new DUT completely intact. The DUT was completely
resistant to the output of the flash all the way up to its max, 600W. No errors or damage to the
DUT came about with this test. The second test used a DUT that had the top plate removed. By
removing this plate, the DUT was completely susceptible to EMI. With the lowest setting,
18.75W, the DUT reset its values. Even a camera flash was able to reset the DUT. However, in
this test the DUT was able to be reprogrammed and used again. The final test used the 600
micrometer pinhole in an effort to direct the flash onto on portion of the DUT. With the f-stop
setting of 4.2 (428.4W), the flash device was able to reset the DUT. Further tests were
conducted to make sure this value was the case. The DUT would consistently fail at the f-stop
setting of 4.2 but not at 4.1.
4.2.5.1 Analysis
It is easily concluded that the outer plate of the DUT helped protect the device from EMI
and other potential harmful effects. By removing this plate, it exposed the device and made it
54

more susceptible to EMI. The simple flash of a camera was able to cause enough EMI in the
circuit to cause a voltage drop throughout the entire FPGA. By dropping the voltage, all the
thresholds were lowered and the resulting outputs from the FPGA turned into 1’s. By adding a
pinhole plate over the DUT, it was able to shield out some of the EMI on the low outputs.
However, once it reached 4.2, the DUT became subject to EMI causing it to fail. Even with a
pinhole, the EMI was not directed toward one portion of the DUT. The entire FPGA failed.
4.3 Summary
This chapter discussed all the results obtained from the five tests to detect and diagnose
errors within the DUT. Some tests were slightly successful. In short, some of the tests were able
to validate the detection portion of the algorithm. The injected fault test was the only test to
exercise the diagnosis part of the algorithm. This was expected since the entire experiment was
run through hardware and was completely controlled by a user. It was disappointing the
remaining tests were unable to fully allow for diagnosing single errors on a circuit. The gamma
and thermal radiation test was able to detect single errors in the voter logic, but were not able to
pinpoint the exact location of the fault. The gamma radiation test had its errors disappear most
likely due to the SEEs only creating temporary damage. The thermal radiation test went beyond
the thermal conductivity of silicon causing the DUT to fail completely. The optical laser test
was not able to produce any real results because of the extra metal plating. Finally, the optical
flash test caused enough EMI to create soft errors when the DUT was completely exposed.
Attempting to pinpoint the flash did not help with any of the results. The pinhole in the end
helped protect the chip from the EMI of the flash device. All in all, these tests do prove that
circuits are still susceptible to multiple forms of radiation which provides an ample amount of
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time and research to be performed to help mitigate errors within a circuit. All result logs can be
found in Appendix I.

56

V. Conclusion
5.1 Chapter Overview
A final wrap up is discussed in this section along with notes and ideas for future work
that could be completed to enhance this particular area of research. The conclusion covers the
success of the implementation of the testing platform and diagnostic algorithm. The TDTMR
conclusion is also discussed in this chapter.
5.2 Conclusion
The first step done for this thesis was correcting the multiple mistakes previously
performed in this area described in Chapter 2. Along with correcting mistakes, three main goals
were the focus of this research; construct a test platform to evaluate circuit designs under various
forms of radiation, develop an algorithm to detect and diagnose errors within a circuit, and
finally study a new design, TDTMR.
The first goal of constructing a test platform to evaluate a circuit while under radiation
was accomplished. The test platform was fully developed to allow a DUT to be placed under
hazardous conditions while the control board performs a full test vector evaluation. The test
platform was also corrected and enhanced from previous designs and work that was done in this
area of research. This platform was used in all five test setups and could be modified to adapt to
other possible test setups. The entire test setup replaces numerous machines and countless man
hours to setup a testing environment.
The goal of developing a method to detect errors and diagnose the location in real time
was accomplished. The algorithm showed its full functionality during the manual injected test.
The algorithm accurately detects single errors and was capable of locating them in the DUT. If
multiple errors occurred at the same time, the algorithm can detect the incorrect outputs, but not
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fully diagnose its location due to the scope of the algorithm. The final results within the logs
showed that multiple errors were accounted for by this algorithm.
Finally, the goal of fully exercising the concept TDTMR was not fully tested with the
current time constraints. However, corrections were made to the original design that was
performed in previous research. The design correctly implements the TMR concept along with
having the design fully laid out on the FPGA instead of being optimized. The results of a few
test setups do, however, indicate that the voting logic is more susceptible to radiation damage
than the three forms of adding logic. Overall, the TDTMR design is prepared and capable of
being fully evaluated given the opportunity.
5.3 Future Work
There is a lot of opportunity for further research and studies within this area. Radiation
effects on electronics continue to be a mystery. There are a lot of areas to investigate further
from this research.
First, the TDTMR design should be more thoroughly investigated. The current research
in this thesis does not fully cover all the possibilities that are out there. TDTMR has the
opportunity to possibly be extremely effective. Having three differing forms of equal logic could
demonstrate that one form of logic is more resilient to errors than another. TDTMR can then
potentially be added to the hardening by design techniques if fully developed. TDTMR could be
taken a step further by utilizing Xilinx’s floor planner tool to place the different logic blocks in
different areas of the FPGA.
Additionally, work could be done to perfect the algorithm to take into account of multiple
bit errors. The algorithm currently is only able to detect for single errors but research and
development of diagnosing multiple error locations could be expanded. Further research for
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fault detection and diagnosis in sequential logic also could be looked into more significantly.
Sequential logic is in more demand and developing an algorithm for detecting and locating faults
would be significant.
Finally, the test platform developed in this research can be modified and utilized for other
forms of radiation. The basic form of the platform is stable and has the potential to be used to
examine other forms of radiation. Gamma radiation was the only form that was immediately
available during this research. With more time, this platform could be used to characterize other
forms of radiation.
The overall framework of this research has been ongoing. However, the research
performed for this thesis provides a more solid foundation to take the concepts of testing and
evaluating radiation effects on electronics to the next level. The goals of this research provides a
better direction and heading for further studies in this field.
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Appendices
Appendix A : Virtex 4 FX Series Mini-Module Datasheet
Found on CD >
Appendix/FX12_man.pdf
Appendix B : Carry Look Ahead Adder Schematic
Found on CD >
Appendix/full_cla.jpg
Appendix C : Ripple Carry Adder Schematic
Found on CD >
Appendix/full_rc.jpg
Appendix D : Virtex II Pro Datasheet
Found on CD >
Appendix/V2P_man
Appendix E : High Speed CMOS Hex Buffer Datasheet
Found on CD >
Appendix/buffer_data.pdf
Appendix F : IC Scoket with Capacitor Datasheet
Found on CD >
Appendix/IC_socket.pdf
Appendix G : TESTCAD Tool Guide
Found on CD >
Appendix/TESTCAD Tool Guide.pdf
Appendix H : Full Fault List
Found on CD >
Appendix/cla_final_FL.xls
Found on CD >
Appendix/rc_final_FL.xls
Appendix I : Result Logs
Found on CD >
Appendix/RESULTS/
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